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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDING^ BELOW
This case involves an appeal* from a final determination of the jury that the negligence of the defendant was not
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

That determin-

ation was reached after a five-day trial.
Defendants accept the plaintiff's statement on appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants accept the statement c}f the case given by
the plaintiff.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendants accept the plaintiff's statement of issues
presented for review.
STATEMENT OF THE FACT$
Ralph Ostler was a passenger riding with his father.
Stephen Ostler, on 1-15
(R.2719:12-20.

between Santaquin and Payson. Utah

2088:18-21).

Mr. Wheeler

stopped

his

truck

with the truck's left-hand side 4'8" to the right of the solid
white

line, fully

(R.2116-2117) .

out

of the travel

lanes of the freeway

The left-hand side of the vehicle was on the

paved shoulder of the road, and the right-hand side of the
vehicle was on the graveled shoulder (R.2118-2121).
The

accident

Utah time (R.2086).

occurred

at

approximately

3:00

a.m..

Mr. Wheeler got out of his truck, checked

for air leaks and tire problems, relieved himself, got back

in, and marked his log.
minutes.

He had been there approximately three

(R. 2156:18-22)

As

he was

onto the highway, he observed

preparing

to move

back

lights *in his rearview mirror,

and was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by Stephen
Ostler (R.2158-2159).
Ralph Ostler

sustained

injuries

causing

lower para-

plegia as a result of the accident.
This
against

suit

was

brought

the driver. Wheeler;

Co.. Inc.;

by Ralph

Ostler

his employer.

for

damages

Albina Transfer

and the owner of the truck. F & R Roe. Inc.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I

The fourteen subparts of plaintiff's Point I on exclusion

of

evidence

were

each

carefully

trial court and correctly ruled upon.

considered

by

the

The trial court applied

Rules 608. 403. 401. 702 and 703 of the Rules of Evidence in
accordance

with

the

prior

decisions

of

the

Utah

appellate

courts.
Point II

tion

of

relevant

The trial

court properly

defendant

Wheeler

to

the

issues

tempts at challenging

of

into

excluded

matters

negligence

credibility,

of Evidence.
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improper

examina-

that were no

and were

longer

improper at-

in violation of the Rules

Point III

alleged

The

trial

prior

bad

court
acts,

properly

excluded

admissibility

in accordance with Rule

of

608 of the

Rules of Evidence.
Point IV
Defense

counsel's

closing

argument was fair

comment

on the instructions given by the court and the evidence which
had been presented.
Point V
The suit was brought against the defendants, and the
instructions of the court informed
turned

a verdict,

Defense counsel's

it would

be

the jury that if they re-

against

all

the

defendants.

closing arguments were fair comment

on the

instructions and the evidence.
Point VI
There was
amendment

no

for punitive

basis

in the

damages.

record

for allowance of

In any event, had the evi-

dence been produced to support a verdict on punitive damages,
the amendment was unnecessary.
Point VII
Even

though

the

court

had

already

given a directed

verdict that defendant Wheeler was negligent, the court nevertheless
their

allowed

an

instruction

to

go

to

the

jury

determination of whether Wheeler was further

to

allow

negligent

in failing to place flares and triangles, even though he was
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stopped

only

statement

three

of

the

minutes.

law

The

instruction

pertaining

to

the

was

federal

a

correct

regulations

cited by the plaintiff.
Point VIII
The

trial

court

allowed

all

appropriate

voir

dire

examination of the jury requested by the plaintiff.

The trial

court

jurors on

only declined

to interrogate the prospective

matters which were improper voir dire.
Point IX
The trial court
demonstration

and

had previously viewed

concluded

that

the videotape

it was not a recreation of

the accident, but a supposition and

conjectural

presentation

not borne out by the circumstances or facts.
Point X
The trial court's Instructions No. 25 and 27 on foreseeability.

proximate

cause were

cause,

and

superseding

in accordance with the decisions

or

intervening

of the Utah Su-

preme Court.
Point XI
The

issue

of

proximate

cause

of

the

negligence

of

Wheeler was properly submitted to the jury as a factual issue
for

their

determination.

Directed

not warranted.
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verdict

on

causation was

POINT I
The Trial Court Properly Considered All Profferred Evidence Regarding Proximate Cause.
A.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Moth Phenomenon.

While

the Court

allowed

the

in camera

testimony of

plaintiff's experts Slade Hulbert and William Hewitt, no foundation was provided

to meet

the criteria

of Rule

702. Utah

that he had written

"a little

Rules of Evidence.
Dr. Hulbert

testified

bit" about highway hypnosis, but said. "I don't fully understand

what

goes

on

about

a phenomenon

there."

(R.2294:1-4)

he characterized

as

He

also

testified

"the lure effect" or

"moth phenomenon", but indicated that in his voluminous writings

on

highway

phenomenon

safety,

(R. 2218:5-14).

he

had

never

written

about

such a

He also said that he did not know

if other researchers had done so (R.2220:12-25).
Dr. Hulbert was asked.

"What factors do you have to

have present to have this luring effect contribute to an accident?" to which he responded:
Well, no one is quite clear in detail on this
phenomenon, but as best I can understand it.
it can occur such a luring or misperception
that the path he's supposed to be following
is directly behind the flashing lights ....
(R.2218:21-25. 2219:1-16).
Dr.

Hulbert

was

asked

what

differentiated

being asleep and being in a low state of arousal.
that

the only way of determining

-5-

t.hp rH ff Ar^nr**

between

He stated
UA<?

vnnwnnrr

whether

the eyes were open or closed,

waves.

Dr. Hulbert

further

admitted

or by studying brainthat

he had

no way of

knowing whether Stephen Ostler's eyes were open or closed, and
had no way to study his brainwaves, and would have been unable
to do so even if the driver had survived.

(R.2221:6-20 - See

Excerpt No. 1. Addendum.)
Appellant

postulates

that

this

testimony

was

prof-

fered to establish that the Ostler driver was not asleep, but
was in a reduced state of alertness.

That testimony was not

admitted because of a lack of foundation and competency.
In excluding that testimony, the trial judge said:
I have heard nothing to indicate any basis
for a determination on his part that there
was a man that was either, that was not
asleep, or that he was merely somewhere impaired in his appreciation of the things
around him .... and I do think it may be
prejudicial to have an opinion that's based
on nothing more than likelihood or a possibility, pure speculation.
(R.2226:15-19. 24-25).
There is nothing that's been shown or indicated that is consistent with being asleep
any less than being with, consistent with
being inattentive.
(R.2227:1-5).
Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to
him at or before the hearing.
If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data

-6-

need not be admissible in evidence, (emphasis
added)
As discussed

by

the U.S. Court

of Appeals

for

the

District of Columbia in Merit Motors, Inc.. v. Chrysler Corp..
569 F.2d 666 (1977) in applying Rule 703 $f
of Evidence, which

is identical

the Federal Rules

to Rule 703.

Utah Rules of

Evidence:
Even
lied
ably
lar
upon

Rule 703 requires that the grounds reon by an expert must be a "feype reasonrelied upon by experts in the particufield in forming opinions ojf inferences
the subject.

Merit at 673.
See also

the recent

case of Craig Food

Industries.

Inc., v. Weihinq. 71 UAR 46. 746 P.2d 279 (1987).
A trial court has considerable discretion in
determining whether expert testimony is admissible.
Dixon v. Stewart. 65^ P.2d 592.
597 (Utah 1982) .
Furthermore, it is within the ttfial court's
discretion in determining whether the "expert
is qualified to give an opinion on a specific
matter. Wessell v. Erickson Landscaping Co..
711 P.2d 250. 253 (Utah 1985).
Even assuming that the "lure ef fecit" or "moth phenomenon" had intellectual validity and was accepted in the field.
Dr. Hulbert does not have sufficient data to reach a conclusion that the phenomenon contributed to thi^ accident.
In discussing the facts upon whidh he based his analysis

and

asked what

his application

of the analysis. Dr. Hulbert was

factors have to be present to have the "lure ef-
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feet" contribute to an accident.

(R.2218:21-23).

Dr. Hulbert

said. "Well, no one is quite clear on this phenomenon, but as
best

I can understand

it..."

and

then

gave

factors required to trigger the phenomenon.

a long

list of

(R.2219:1-16).

Dr. Hulbert was then asked.
Q: Okay. Did you find any. in your analysis
of this accident, did you find any of those
factors present?
A:
I don't have any evidence that any of
those factors were present. No. I don't.
(R.2219:17-20).
In Fisher v. Trapp. 73 UAR 105. 748 P.2d

(1988). the

Court of Appeals reaffirmed:
The trial court's determination of adequate
foundation is solely within the discretion of
the trial court.
Tias v. Proctor. 591 P.2d
438. 440 (Utah 1979);
see also Craig Food
Indus, v. Weihinq. [supra].
The Court further said:
Further.
"[t]he admissibility
of accident
reconstruction
evidence
depends
in
large
measure upon the foundation laid. The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical
nexus between his opinion and the facts adduced must be established."
Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328. 1331 (Utah 1979).
The

basis

of

defendants'

contention

that

the

"moth

effect" testimony is inadmissible is set forth fully in defendants'

Motions

in

Limine

(R.1557-1584.

1531-1556).

The

court's ruling after hearing plaintiff's experts in camera was
that an adequate foundation had not been laid.
of defendants' motions in limine was correct.
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The granting

B.

Exclusion

of

Evidence

that

Father

Ostler

Was

Awake.
The issue on whether or not Stephen Ostler was awake
was supposedly based on the testimony of the defendant driver.
Wheeler,

who was

asked

what

he

saw when the

vehicle approached

from the rear.

like

was

the

thought
attempted
mind

of

vehicle

he was

changing

pulling

to use Wheeler's
the

driver

to

He said he thought it was

lanes,

in behind

lights of the

ahd

him.

conjecture

demonstrate

that

the

Plaintiff's

driver
experts

as to what was in the

that

the driver

was

not

above. Dr. Hulbert

was

asleep.
As

was

set

out

in Point

A

asked how he could differentiate between sleep and a low state
of

arousal,

and

how

he

could

determine

driver was asleep or merely drowsy.
After

listening

whether

the

He was unable to do so.

to plaintiff's

testimony,

the trial

judge stated:
THE COURT: Counsel. I don't have any question the expertise of the doctor in several
fields.
But I'm not persuaded that in this
case the testimony is going to be helpful to
the Jury. I've heard nothing to indicate any
basis for a determination on hift part that
there was a man that was either, that was not
asleep, or that he was merely qomewhat impaired in his appreciation of the things
around him.
It seems to me that that's something that the
jury can. just as well as anyone else, can
infer and can determine from their own experience in this type of a circumstance, and
that it can be argued by counsejL.
I don't

-9-

Ostler

see that it's going to be helpful from that
standpoint. And I do think it may be prejudicial to have an opinion that's based on
nothing more than likelihood or a possibility, pure speculatin.
The facts are that the man ran off and hit
into the back of the truck. There is nothing
that's been shown or indicated that that is
consisten with being asleep, any less than
being with, consistent with being inattentive.
So that the Court is going to sustain the
objection to the testimony of the doctor on
that basis. (emphasis added).
(R.2226:12-25. 2227:1-7).
The

court

sustained

defendants'

objections

to

Dr.

Hulbert's testimony.
Plaintiff's conclusion that a shallow angle of impact
indicates the driver was awake is without expert testimony and
without foundation.

Dr. Hulbert did not claim to be an acci-

dent reconstructionist. but said he was a "human factors research
he

scientist."

was

a

(R.2187:7-8).

"transportation

Mr. Hewitt

consultant".

testified

(R.2250:16-17)

that
He

claimed he had been gualified as an accident reconstructionist
from the late 1960's until 1982. but then elected, because of
the voluminous material

coming

out under

both

reconstruction

and motor carriers, to separate these two and to maintain his
expertise

as

a

consultant

of

compliance

with

motor

vehicle

regulations.
The suggestion
the previous

road

stop

that Stephen Ostler was not tired at
ignores

the fact

-10-

that

that

stop was

north of Cedar City in the Beaver area, far removed from the
time and place of the accident.
structionist

could use that

No qualified accident recon-

statement to determine that Ste-

phen Ostler was not asleep at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff

further

suggests

that

had

Stephen

Ostler

been asleep he would have run straight off the road at a curve
in the

roadway

prior

to

the

accident

sdene.

That

argument

ignores the fact that the driver did leave the road beyond the
curve.

Whenever

the

driver

fell

asleep,

it was

apparently

shortly before leaving the travel lane.
Plaintiff

further

claimed

that

a

sleeping

driver

would relax to such extent that he would hot keep his foot on
the gas pedal, and his vehicle would slow considerably before
drifting

off

the

road.

In

reconstructionist

testified

eling

in

at

48 mph

a

driver may have relaxed

fact,

the

plaintiff's

accident

that the Ostler vehicle was trav-

55 mph

zone, demonstrating

prior to impact.

that

the

Such confirms that

he was probably asleep.
The claim

that

the Ostler

driver} was not asleep is

pure speculation, unsupported by competent evidence and testimony.
cient

The court's determination was that there was insuffifoundation

for

admission

of

plaintiff's

expert

testi-

mony, or for a conclusion to be made by anyone that the Ostler
driver was not asleep.

-11-

The citations in plaintiff's brief on relevancy are
inapplicable, since the exclusion of the evidence as to the
sleeping

driver was predicated

expertise, not on relevancy.
United States. 485 U.S.

upon 'lack of foundation and
The citation to Huddleston v.

;

108 S.Ct. 1496;

99 L.Ed. 2nd

771 (1988). merely confirms that the trial judge acted appropriately in determining that the evidence was not supported by
adequate

foundation.

His

decision was

in complete harmony

with the citations given by plaintiff.
C.

Exclusion

of

Evidence

Regarding

Violation

of

Federal Regulations.
Plaintiff

submitted

a pretrial

motion

summary judgment on the issue of negligence.

for

partial

He asserted that

alleged violation of ICC driving time regulations was a basis
for granting his motion.
partial

summary

(R.1090-1098).
(R.1205-1213).

Defendants filed a countermotion for

judgment.
Plaintiff

(R.1088-89)
replied

to

with

a

memorandum

defendants1

motion

The trial court granted defendants1 motion for

partial summary judgment, saying:
The Court is of the opinion, conceding for
the sake of argument that such driving time
regulations were violated. that any such
violation would be entirely irrelevant to
Plaintiff's claims of negligence in this
case. Provided, that should Defendants present evidence at trial in support of a defense that Defendant acted as a result of an
emergency or justification in parking, then
it may be appropriate for Plaintiff to present evidence of any such violation of ICC
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Driving Time Regulations in rebuttal of such
a defense, (emphasis added) (R.12^4-1245)
It is inappropriate to argue thaj: any alleged violation of driving time regulations had any connection with this
accident.

The regulations are designed t<> limit driving time

so that operaters of motor carriers will remain alert while in
actual operation of the vehicle.
at the time of the accident,

Mr. Wheeler was not driving

but was

stopped.

Had

Wheeler

been driving for only one hour prior to stopping, it would not
have prevented the accident.

The amount of time Wheeler oper-

ated his vehicle has no significance in this case.
The

court

complied

exactly

with

the

mandate

pro-

nounced in Pierce v. Wisstesen. 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985)
balanced

the probative value

against

countervailing

and

factors.

The court concluded that the evidence should not be admitted.
In so ruling, the court locked the defendants in to not presenting evidence as to emergency or justification on the condition that if they put in evidence on justification, he might
admit the driving logs with the alleged violations prejudicial
to the defendants.
Despite the ruling, plaintiff's counsel attempted

to

put in evidence of alleged violation of driving time regulations (R.1978).
if

justification

The court reiterated
or

emergency

would reconsider the matter.

were

its ruling, saying that
raised,

then

the

court

Defense counsel committed to the
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court that no such evidence would be presented (T.1979:16-18).
and it was not.
The court

instructed

the

jury that Wheeler's negli-

gence had been ruled on as a matter of law at the request of
plaintiff's counsel, and that Wheeler was negligent in parking
the vehicle where he did (T.2152:7-16).
In Pierce v. Wisstesen,
the admissibility

supra, where

the

issue was

of the illegal purchase and consumption of

alcoholic beverages two days prior to the accident, the Court
said:
If evidence has some probative value, but has
a tendency to unduly prejudice or confuse the
issues or to mislead the jury, the trial
court
must
balance
the
probative
value
against those countervailing factors to determine whether the evidence should be admitted, (emphasis added)
at 482.
There is no causal link between the alleged violation
of

driving

time

regulations

and

the

plaintiff's

injuries.

Defendant was not driving at the time of the accident, and any
hazard created by the defendant in parking was not due to the
alleged violation of driving time regulations.
The statute was intended to avoid the risk of exposing

other

drivers

to one whose driving

ability was

impaired

due to his violation of the regulation, not to avoid the risk
of

someone

negligently

crashing

while he was stopped.
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into

the

driver's

vehicle

Having
Wheeler

was

found

negligent

as

a

matter

and

that

of

law

defendants

that

would

evidence as to justification, the issue was moot.

defendant
not

put in

Plaintiff's

claim that the court erred in excluding evidence of the violation of the driving time regulations is without merit.
D.

Exclusion

of

Evidence

Regarding

Purpose

of the

Emergency Lanes.
The in camera

testimony of Slade Hulbert

included a

general statement as to the paved shoulder being for the purpose of accomodating disabled or errant vehicles.

The testi-

mony was given in connection with a claim of foreseeability.
In view of the court's previous ruling that parking a vehicle
on the shoulder was negligence as a matteif of law. any testimony of the purpose of the lane was immaterial and irrelevant.
Plaintiff's contention that the exclusion of such evidence was
error is without merit.
E.

Exclusion

of

Evidence

Regarding

Foreseeability

(Road Designers).
During Dr. Hulbert's testimony, while the court considered

defendants'

queried

Mr.

Hulbert

motion
as

to

straying onto the shoulder.
to the effect

that

such

in
the

limine.

plaintiff's

foreseeability

of

counsel
vehicles

The court allowed that testimony

circumstance was

foreseeable.

the court inquired of the witness.
THE COURT: Mr. Hulbert. do you have to be an
expert to know that?
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Then

THE WITNESS:
No.
You don't.
You don't.
It's just that it is foreseeable.
I would
say it's common knowledge that that occurs.
(R.2206:15-19)
Based on the witness' testimony that his opinion was
not helpful to the jury because they could make this analysis
as readily as Dr. Hulbert could, the court excluded

evidence

on foreseeability by the claimed expert.
The

plaintiff's

contention

that

the

court

erred

in

excluding such testimony is without merit.
F.

Exclusion

of

Evidence

of

Foreseeability

(Truck

Drivers)
Plaintiff's counsel asked Mr. Hewitt, his ostensible
expert, for an opinion on whether truckers would find a collision with a parked vehicle foreseeable, based upon his seminars with truckers and the "common talk" he heard when truckers talk to each other.
common

subject

"at

Hewitt replied that such talk was a

least

since

1982."

(R.2267:1-7, 14-22 -

See Excerpt No. 2, Addendum.)
The mere fact that a subject may have been brought up
during seminars, or that it should be foreseeable to a truck
driver,

does not

establish

a foundation

to show that

it is

expert opinion, since it is truckers who generally raise the
question, or that such information is relied upon by experts.
The

fact

that

Hewitt

may

have

provided

a

handout

illustrating regulations on placement of warning devices does
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not establish foreseeability.

Such devices, according to the

regulations and Hewitt's testimony, are required to be placed
only after a truck has been stopped fx>r at least ten minutes.
No

evidence

negated

parked

only

two

Hewitt

to make

testimony! that

Wheeler's

or

three

such

a

minutes.

claim.

he

had

testimony

No

Nevertheless,

the

been

qualified
court

gave

Instruction No. 24 to the jury, that if Wneeler was parked for
more than ten minutes, then he was in violation of the statute
for not having placed flares or triangles.
G.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Test Results.

Prior

to trial, plaintiff

filed

a motion

in limine

l

for

a pretrial

ruling

on

the

prepared under his direction.
dants

responded

"

with

..

admissibility

of

a

videotape

(R.906-915, 1027-1034).

a memorandum

opposing

.

that

Defen-

motion

and

I

making their own motion in limine, asking the court to bar the
showing

of

the videotape.

(R.968-976,

9^77-983).

The

court

heard arguments and viewed the videotape on October 23, 1987.
On October

27, 1988, the court denied

limine and granted defendants1 motion.

plaintiff's motion in
(R.1197).

This matter is fully discussed under Point IX, infra.
H.

Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Emergency Devices.

After
flares
court

and
asked

the

so-called

triangles
if

only

could
an

expert
have

expert

had

averted
could

been
the

asked

whether

accident,

appreciate

that.

the
The

expert admitted that no expertise was involved in understand-
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ing,

accepting

testimony

or

was

appreciating

really

only

a

it.

and

good

that

human

factors

of

common

sense.

deal

(R.2214a:18-25. 2215:1)
The expert's claim was also premised
that

on the concept

if warning devices had been put out. the driver of the

Ostler vehicle would have seen them.

In fact, if the driver

was asleep, he would not have seen them at all.
so-called
asleep

Further, the

expert could not testify that the decedent was not

at

the

time of the accident.

(R.2221:6-20)

On that

basis, he certainly could not suppose that had flares been put
out. the driver would have seen them and avoided the accident.
Thus, the testimony of the so-called

expert on the impact of

emergency devices was based on conjecture.

Plaintiff's argu-

ment is without merit.
I.

The Excluded Evidence Was Not Admissible.

Plaintiff

contends

that

the

evidence is controlled by Restatement
While

this writer

Torts

differs

does

from

not

that

contend

contained

issues here are controlled

Torts

court

supports

submitted

what

its

cause,

intervening

pellant

suggests

was

(Second) of Torts. 447.
that

the Restatement

in plaintiff's

done

in

this

instructions

to

the

the

the

brief,

of
the

The citation to the Restatement

cause, and
that

of

by case law of the Courts of Ap-

peals of the State of Utah.
of

admissibility

case, wherein
jury

on

sole proximate cause.

trial
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court

did

not

the

proximate
The ap-

comply

with

comment on Clause C in the Restatement ofl Torts;

however, it

is this writer's contention that the very issue presented to
the jury was whether or not the intetvening act was the sole
proximate cause.
In support of the issue of foresteeability, plaintiff
cites Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d

217 (1983).

In that case, the bus was stopped with its rear end extending
into the street.
seeable

that

a

The court held that it ^as reasonably foremomentarily

inattentive

that bus in the lane of traffic.

driver

might

strike

In the ctase now before this

Court, the Albina truck was stopped 4 , 8 M to the right of the
solid

line of

1-15.

The

jury was instructed

that they must

consider the foreseeability under those circumstances, and the
jury decided

against

not foreseeable that
traffic
lights.

and

strike

the plaintiff.
someone would

a parked

They found

that

it was

drive out of the lane of

truck with its flashing warning

The instructions given by the court as No. 25 (R.1671

-1672). No. 26 (R.1673-1674) and No. 27 (R.1675-1676) correctly reflect the reguirements mandated in Harris.
This issue is more fully addressed in Point X. infra.
J.

Basis for the Trial Court!s Exclusion of Evidence.

Prior

to

trial, defendants

filed

motions

in limine

I
citing to the depositions
Hewitt.

of plaintiff's experts Hulbert and

At the trial, the court allowed the plaintiff to take

the testimony of his experts out of the hearing of the jury to
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lay a foundation for their testimony.
several

hours

of

testimony,

the

At the conclusion of

court

granted

defendants'

motions in limine for the reason that plaintiff had not established a foundation to show either that his witnesses were
experts or that their theories were accepted by other experts
and

accident

reconstructionists.

The

court's

exclusion of

their testimony was fully documented in the record.
K.

Qualifications of Ralph Ostler's Expert (Hulbert).

The resume of Mr. Hulbert is attached to the defendants' motion in limine (R.1574-1584).

That resume shows that

Mr. Hulbert has written and done studies in many areas.

None

of those writings and studies are in the area on which he was
being asked to testify.

He testified that he had never writ-

ten on a "lure effect" or "moth phenomenon" (R.2218:5-14) and
that he was not aware of any researchers who had written on
that subject (R.2220:12-25).
Despite Mr. Hulbert's obvious qualifications in some
of the fields set forth in his resume, he was not qualified,
nor did he have the foundation, to testify to those matters
which plaintiff attempted to elicit from him.

Thus, his tes-

timony was rejected by the court.
L.

Admissibility of the Excluded Evidence.

Appellant

suggests

that

"no one seriously

that the excluded evidence was not relevant."

contends

One cannot tell

what evidence appellant refers to, but certainly the defen-
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dants always contended

that the driver's logs were not rele-

vant to the issues to be presented to the iury.

The court so

ruled.
Defendants' contention was then, and is now, that the
testimony of the so-called
quate

experts was not supported by ade-

foundation, nor was the testimony

to be elicited

from

them of a nature generally accepted by experts in the field.
The testimony was therefore novel, unsupported, lacked foundation, and was inadmissible.
Appellant

assumes

that

the exclusion was

solely upon Rule 702, pertaining
dence would assist the jury.
it was foundationally
of the trial

to whether

predicated

or not the evi-

However, defendants contend that

deficient.

In addition, the quotation

judge's rulings demonstrate his conclusion that

it would not assist the trier of fact, particularly in view of
the "waffling" by both experts in their responses to specific
questions about this accident.
One of the crucial issues to be decided by the trial
judge in determining whether to allow an expert to testify is
whether the matter at issue is within the common knowledge and
experience of the jury.

As set forth in Day v. Lorenzo Smith

and Sob, Inc.. 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186:
Expert testimony is not admissable solely
because the witness has some skill in a particular field, but is admissable, if at all,
only because the witness can offer assistance
on a matter not within the knowledge or com-
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mon experience of people of ordinary intelligence.
Id at 226.
In Edwards v. Didericksen. supra, the Court reiterated Day, stating that "experts should only testify to opinions
which laymen are not competent to reach".

Jd.. at 1331.

In Zimmer v. Miller Trucking Co.. Inc.. 743 F.2d 601
(1984). the Eighth Ciruit Court of Appeals applied Rule 702.
Federal Rules of Evidence.
a police

officer

to testify

The trial court declined to allow
that

illegal parking

caused

the

accident, and held that Rule 702 only permits
a qualified expert to testify in the form of
an opinion if the witness* specialized knowledge will assist the jury to understand the
evidence or decide a fact in issue.
[Citations omitted]
...if the subject matter is
within the knowledge or experience of layman,
expert testimony is superfluous.
Id at 604.
As set forth in In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans. LA., 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Circuit. 1986):
The trial judge ought to insist that a proper
expert bring to the jury more than the lawyers can offer in argument.
Indeed. the
premise of receiving expert opinion is that
it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue".
Id. at 1233.
Appellant's
analysis.

The

experts

jury was

brought

capable

experience and understanding

of

nothing
drawing

to

the

jury's

on their

common

to determine whether the parking

-22-

of the truck created a dangerous condition, or that the risk
of an errant

vehicle

running

into the ttuck was or was not

foreseeable.
The danger of allowing an expert to express an opinion on a matter within the common experience and knowledge of
the jury is that there is a high likelihood that the jury will
allow the expert opinion to supplant the exercise of their own
independant

judgment.

Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co.. 789 F.2d

1052 (4th Circuit. 1987).
Dr. Hulbert was not gualified as an expert to render
an opinion on the cause of the collision.

Rule 702 allows an

opinion by an expert only when his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education qualifies him to render an opinion.

Dr. Hulbert has no training

construction.

(R. 1574-1584)

in physics or accident re-

His training and experience is

as a psychologist, more particularly as a consultant in human
factors.

He

structionist

repeatedly

testified

and was not qualified

that

he was not

a recon-

by training or experience

to reconstruct the cause of the accident.

In fact, the basis

upon which Dr. Hulbert reached his conclusion that the parking
of the

truck

alongside

the highway caused

this collision is

simply that if the truck had not been there, the crash would
not have occurred.
The

(R.1903. page 44:6-16)

infinite

variety

of

fact

circumstances

and

the

creative testimony of consultants eager to hire themselves out
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requires the judge to carefully determine what to allow to be
presented to the jury.

As discussed in In re Air Crash, supra:

Our customary deference also 'assumes that the
Trial Judge actually exercised his discretion.
In saying this, we recognized the
temptation to answer objections to receipt of
expert testimony with the shorthand remark
that the jury will give it "the weight it
deserves11. This nigh reflective explanation
may be sound in some cases, but in others it
can mask a failure by the Trial Judge to come
to grips with an important trial decision.
Trial judges must be sensitive to the qualifications of persons claiming to be experts.
Because the universe of experts is defined
only by the virtually infinite variety of
fact questions in the trial courts, the signals of competence cannot be catalogued,
(emphasis added)
Id. at 1233. 1234.
The Court went

on to identify two important

signals

that the judge can look for in expert testimony:
We know from our judicial experience that
many such able persons present studies and
express opinion that they might not be willing to express in articles submitted to a
refereed journal of their discipline or in
other context subject to peer review.
We
think that is one important signal, along
with many others, that ought to be considered
in deciding whether to accept expert testimony .
Id. at 1234.
As Dr. Hulbert testified, while he has published many
writings on the subject of sleeping drivers he has never included any mention of the "lure effect".
See Merit Motors. Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.. supra, in
applying Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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Because of the lack of acceptance of this lure effect
by experts in the field, the trial court refused to allow Dr.
Hulbert to testify concerning it or his qonclusions resulting
from its use.
Dr. Hulbert

further

admitted

that he could not know

whether the Ostler driver was asleep, and thus could not know
whether

his

lure

effect

Systems, Inc., 789 F.2d,
Circuit

Court

of

applied.
269

Appeals,

In Newman v. Hy-way Heat

(4th Circuit. 1986). the Fourth

commenting

on

identical

evidence dealing with expert opinion as used

rules of

in Utah, stated

that
It is fixed law that "an expert can give his
opinion on the basis of hypothetical facts.
but those facts must be established by independent evidence properly introduced".
[Citations omitted]...
Nothing in the rules appears to have been intended to permit experts
to speculate in fashions unsupported by, and
in this case indeed in contradiction of, the
uncontroverted evidence in this case.
The
expert opinion as to causation here constitutes no more than such speculation, and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
striking the same, (emphasis adde<^)
The evidence was properly prohibited within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
M.

Standard of Review for Excluded Evidence.

Defendants agree that the standard of review for the
exclusion

of

expert

testimony

considerable discretion.

is

within

the

trial

court's

The rulings on admission of evidence

are not overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.
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Defen-

dants further agree with the quotation from In re Air Crash.
supra, which says:
In deciding whether explanation of an expert
will assist the jury or judge, the superior
position of the trial judge over the appellate judge is apparent.
Id. at 1233.
There is no showing
abuse

of

discretion

by

the

in this case that there was any
trial

judge.

His

exclusion

of

evidence was based on the lack of foundation and expertise for
admissibility.
N.

Prejudice Because of Excluded Evidence.

Appellants
side

of

the

story.

suggest
The

that

record

defendant
shows

Wheeler

that

plaintiff

Wheeler as an adverse party three separate times.
ses were

to questions asked

not called

by the defense.

story,

it

was

those

facts

only

in his

because
case

by plaintiff's

told

his

called

His respon-

counsel.

He was

If Wheeler told his side of the
plaintiff's

in chief.

counsel

brought

out

Plaintiff's

counsel

now

complains about the information he elicited.
The

inadmissibility

of

the

driving

logs

lack of relevance has been previously discussed.

and

their

The sugges-

tion that the driver of the Ostler vehicle was not asleep but
was in a reduced
evidence.

state of awareness is not borne out by the

As such, no prejudice to plaintiff's case came as a

result of the exclusion of such evidence.
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POINT II
The Trial Court Did Not Und\ily Restrict
Ostler's Right to Cross-Examine Wheeler on
the Issue of Searching for a Place to Stop,
Appellant

claims

sustain the defendants1
Wheeler,

that

it

was

reversible

error

to

objection to the question directed to

"How long had you been looking for a place to stop

and urinate before you actually stopped?"
objection was based
the question.
plaintiff's

on the

irrelevance

In a colloquy

counsel

(R.2089:2-5)•

and

The

immateriality

of

between the court and counsel,

asserted

that

if

asked

that

question.

Wheeler would answer as he had on deposition that he had £een
looking for 30 minutes.

Counsel then purported that he would

submit Exhibit No. 4. a large aerial map showing a number of
signs

within

the

last

several

miles

prilor to

the

point

of

stopping where he could have stopped (R.2069:22-25. 2090-2096).
Defense counsel objected, since there are any number
of reasons he would not use those exits on an unfamiliar road
(R.2082).

Plaintiff's attempt was to forcje defendants to show

justification

(R.2092:1-7).

Since

the

court

had

ruled

that

defendants could not put on evidence to justify the stop without

opening

driver's

the

logs,

door
then

for
the

plaintiff's
question

of

counsel
how

looked for a place to stop was immaterial.

to submit

long

Wheeler

the
had

At that point, the

issues before the court were the negligence of Wheeler, proximate cause, and damages.
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During

that

raised that issue.

discussion,

(R.2099)

plaintiff's

counsel

again

Plaintiff's counsel also renewed

his motion for a directed verdict on tire issue of negligence.
The court then indicated that if the defendants would
not put on evidence to justify the stop, the ordinance prohibiting a stop would be sufficient to support a directed verdict
on

negligence.

2103:1-22)

The

(R.2100:13-25.
court

granted

directed verdict on negligence.

2101:1-4.
the

2102:9-16.

plaintiff's

19-25.

motion

for a

(R.2104:21-25. 2105:1-6)

Plaintiff indicated that that ruling shuffled part of
his evidence, and he would

skip to deal with proximate cause

and damages, the only remaining factual issues (R.2105:16-25).
The court
gence, and that

informed

the jury of its ruling on negli-

the matter would be decided on the basis of

proximate cause and damages.

(R.2152:7-21)

On appeal, plaintiff
how

long

Wheeler

Wheeler's

had

claims that the guestion about

looked

truthfulness.

for

However,

a

place

to

plaintiff's

stop

goes

counsel

to

admits

that he had placed in evidence the driver's logs, showing the
accident

time as 2:00 a.m. PST (Exhibit No. 3 ) . and a state-

ment given to an investigator that Wheeler had pulled off the
highway at 1:30 or 1:45 (Exhibits 19 and 20).

Those items and

the discrepancies in them so strongly urged by plaintiff were
already

in

deposition

evidence.
testimony

The
was

court
the

held

same
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as

that
his

since
trial

Wheeler's
testimony.

there was no discrepancy for impeachment.

The question of how

long he had been looking for a place to stop could not be used
to challenge his credibility.
Counsel
witness.

wanted

However,

to use

the

aerial map

to

impeach

the

of that t]estiraony was to open

the tendancy

an issue which the court had already ruled upon.
Under

Rule

608(b).

instances of conduct
supporting

his

evidence."

Utah Rules

credibility...may

The

"specific

of a witness for purpose of attacking or

question

as

not

be

proved

by

extrinsic

of the drl iver's logs would

Thus, the admission

prohibited.

of Evidence,

to

how

for a place to stop, and the attempt
part and parcel of the same idea.

long

Wheeler

had

be

looked

to u se Exhibit No. 4. is

The triiil judge said.

I think the tendancy of that tes timony is to
get into an issue that the court has already
ruled as not being admissible iji this case.
Mr. DeBry.
You've
got your
Record.
The
court is going to sustain the objection.
Rule

401

of

the

Rules

of

Evidence

defines

relevant

evidence as that
...having any tendency to make t}he existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action morel probable or
less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
In

this

case,

proximate

cause

and

lant

now

complains

been

determined,

with

damages,
would

and

the

only

regaining

the question

have

Wheeler's

no

relevahcy.

credibility
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about

issues
which

being
appel-

Negligence

could

only

go

had
to

the issue of whether

he was negligent

in stopping or to im-

properly impugn his character.
In addition, the intent to
could

only be drawn

from

S*LOW

counsel's

Wheeler to be a liar

inuendo. and

not

by the

evidence itself.
In this area, the trial court's discretion is broad
and

has

been

reaffirmed

on

numerous

occasions.

Safeway Stores. Inc. . 565 P.2d 1139 (1977).

Martin

v.

Only an abuse of

discretion will overturn the judge's ruling on the examination
of witnesses.

Perkins v. Fit Well Artificial Limb. 514 P.2d

811. 30 Ut. 2d 151 (1973).
The question was properly excluded.
POINT III

The Trial Court Did Not Unduly
Ostler's Right to Impeach Wheeler
Bad Acts.

Restrict
by Prior

Appellant contends that he should have been permitted
to submit the driver's

logs and Hewitt's testimony to illus-

trate a violation of the ICC regulations on driving time.

He

contends that these were offered as impeachment and that Rules
404(b) and 608(b). Utah Rules of Evidence, allow their admission into evidence.
Wheeler's
out

his

supra.

He contends that those violations attack

credibility
logs.

by

Appellant

He claims

that

showing

he had

fraudulently

cites Huddleston v. United

the evidence
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proffered

filled
States,

in Huddleston

was not to show Huddleston's prior bad atts to prove that he
was a bad man. but to show knowledge
In the instant case, the evidenc^ appellant claims as
impeachment

on credibility is specificallkr prohibited by Rule

608(b). Utah Rules of Evidence:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rjile 609. may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They
may, however, in the discretion i?£ the court,
if probative of truthfulness oij untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness (1) concerning his character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which
character the witness being cposs-examined
has testified.
The Utah Supreme Court

has recently

spoken

subject, in State v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186 (1988):
The rebuttal testimony offered in this case
was in the form of specific instances of
conduct. supposedly offered to attack the
credibility of defendant.
This is in direct
contravention of the plain language of Rule
608.

Such use of this evidence violates Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which
states:
(b) Evidence of other crirn^ s. wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in o rder to show
that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may. however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of| motive, opportunity,
intent. preparation.
plan.
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on that

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, (emphasis added)
Appellant now suggests that his evidence would show
motive.

He misinterprets the rule.

The rule is intended to

allow the introduction of specific acts to show a motive for
committing the act which is the wrong of which complaint is
made.

In this case, it was not so intended, but was to show,

ostensibly, that Wheeler lied about his logs and that therefore he might lie about how long he had been parked.
The Court is also cited to State v. DiAlo. 748 P.2d
194 (1987) at 199. wherein the Court said:
The marginal probative value of this evidence
was overwhelmingly outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice and confusion of
the issues submitted to the jury and its
admission clearly affected the substantial
rights of the defendant.
Had the trial judge in this case admitted the logs
and a witness to interpret them, the marginal probative value
of that evidence is overwhelmingly outweighed by the prejudice
visited upon the defendants.

It would have been a clear vio-

lation of Rule 608(b) to have allowed this extrinsic evidence.
In addition, the trial court specifically exercised
its prerogative under Rule 403. which provides that relevant
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues or misleading of the jury.

That position is

further demonstrated by State v. Miller. 709 P.2d 350 (1985):
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Notwithstanding the relevance of evidence,
however, the trial judge is within the scope
of his discretion in excluding under the
provisions of Rule 403 [quoting the rule]...
As the Fourth Circuit Court commented in
United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th
Cir. 1982). with reference to yery similar
evidence:
At the outset, we must recall that the appraisal of the probative and prejudicial
value of evidence under Rule 403 is entrusted
to the sound discretion of the trial judge;
absent extraordinary circumstances. The Court
of Appeal will not intervene in its resolution, [citations omitted] (emphasis added)

The trial court exhibited a reasonable concern that the tendency to confuse the issues
or mislead the jury outweighed the probative
value of such evidence.
The statement

of the trial

judge in ruling on that

evidence is indicative of that kind of concern and consideration of the issues (R.2104:18-25. 2105:l-lt).
Appellant's

supposition

that

Wheeler

had

a

strong

motive to lie about how long he had been stopped ignores the
fact
would

that

if he was

guilty

of

driving

have had a stronger motivation

time

violations, he

to suggest

that he had

been stopped for a longer period of time so as to minimize his
on-road time.

The inference suggested by appellant is simply

not borne out by the facts.
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POINT IV
Wheeler's Lawyer Was Not Permitted to Misstate The Law During Closing Argument.
The
from

statement

plaintiff's

complained

of

was

counsel's own argument

a

comment

on the

adopted

improbability

of the precise occurrence (R.1952:11-16).
Plaintiff

claims

that

the

only

explanation

jury's verdict was a misstatement of the law.

for

the

Plaintiff cited

the case of Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (1977) to say
"The

terse misstatement

could

have

been

tersely

corrected."

Id. at 412.
Throughout
objected.

closing

argument.

plaintiff's

counsel

Three times the judge admonished the jury:
The Jury is instructed that testimony or
statements of counsel is not evidence. You've
heard the evidence, you'll determine what it
is.

(R.1914:10-12)
The Jury will read the Instructions and be
bound by them, and statements of counsel are
not evidence, ladies and gentlemen.
(R.1919:14-16)
The jury is directed to look at the Instructions.
They set forth the law in that
regard.
Statement
of
counsel
is to be
disregarded except as it is accurate.
(R.1927:5-8)
If

anything,

plaintiff's

repetitive

objections

and

the court's three admonishments negate any claim that the jury
was misled

by any inconseguential
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remark.

It should

further

be noted that the Court had carefully rea4 the instructions to
the jury, with deliberateness and cautioi}. and had also provided written instructions.
The emphasis

given

to the clain^ of misstatement

by

plaintiff's objections during closing argument, and the admonitions given by the court, might well be construed as detrimental

to the defendants1

case by putting undue emphasis on

the fact that statements of counsel should not be considered
as statements of the law. thus implying that such statements
were not proper statements.
Plaintiff
P.2d

also

cites

. 85 UAR 3 (1988).

State

v.

Shickles.

That case dealt with a prosecu-

tor who. in closing argument, stated that the accused if found
not guilty by reason of insanity would
An objection was made.
statement:
The

withdrew

statement
did

not

he was

request

w4lk[] out the door."

The prosecutor m^l^e another erroneous

[T]his Court

prosecutor

which
case

n

u

a

loses
his

jurisdiction...."

statement,

withdrawing.
curative

but

it

Id. at 6.
was

Thfe defendant

instruction,

but

unclear
in that
the

Utah

Supreme Court states that it might have h^lDed avoid difficulty.

Id. at 7.
Plaintiff's counsel in this case failed to inform the

Court of the difficulty the Missouri couift had in Halford v.
Yandell. supra, with this question.
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Tha^: court cited nearly

two columns of cases ruling the different ways under different
fact circumstances, i.e.:
In other cases no reversible terror was found
although the trial court made no express
ruling but told the jury to following the
instructions: Manlev v. Horton. 414 S.W.2d
254. 259[7] (Mo. 1967);
Hampy v. Midwest
Hanger Co.. 355 S.W.2d 415. 420[6] (Mo. App.
1962);
State v. Morant, 271 S.W.2d 230.
232[3. 4] (Mo. App. 1954); Forsythe v. Railway Express Agency. 125 S.W.2d 539. 542[4]
(Mo. App. 1939);
Best v. Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins. Co.. 49 S.W.2d 230 232[7]
(Mo. App. 1932);
Helfrick v. Taylor. 440
S.W.2d 940. 946[9-ll] (Mo. 1969). etc.
id., at 411.
Defendants maintain the statements of defense counsel
were fair commentary on the evidence and the instructions, and
in any event did not prejudice the plaintiff's case.
POINT V
The Statements of Defense Counsel During
Closing Argument Were Neither Improper Nor
Prejudicial.
In his amended complaint

(R.103-106). plaintiff sued

defendants for medical expenses and lost wages, both past and
future, and

general

damages

in the amount

of $10,000,000.

Plaintiff further placed into evidence testimony and exhibits
claiming special damages in an amount exceeding $3,000,000.
The complaint

asked

for a

against the defendants.

judgment

for the damage amounts

The amounts claimed in the complaint

and in the trial evidence far exceeded any amount of insurance
that the defendants might have.
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In giving Instruction No. 28. the court stated:
Therefore, if you find that the negligence of
Wheeler was a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries, then both F&R Roe and Albina are
automatically responsible for any damages you
award.
(From Plaintiff's Reguested Instruction #18. R.1623)
The closing part of Instruction No. 38 reads:
If you find that defendant Stanley Wheeler
was negligent. and such negligence was a
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, the
plaintiff is entitled to collect the entire
amount of damage you assess in this case from
the defendants.
That instruction was framed so that the jury would
know that under joint and several liability, which the court
had already ruled was applicable, the plaintiff would be entitled

to collect the entire amount of any award

from the

defendants.
That instruction should also be viewed in connection
with Instruction No. 29. given at plaintiff's reguest. that
even though plaintiff's father was driving the car in which
plaintiff was injured, the law permitted the plaintiff to sue
only Wheeler and his employers.
The fact that all or part of any judgment might be
paid by the defendants through their insurance contracts does
not

minimize

the

fact

that

the

judgment

would

be entered

against the defendants.

The argument of defense counsel was

not

merely

inappropriate.

and

given by the court.
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reiterated

the

instructions

As pointed
P.2d
to

out

in Harmon v. Sprouse Reitz Co., 445

773, 21 Utah 2d 361
read

instructions

and

facts or lack thereof.

(1968). counsel should be permitted
argue

their

applicability

to

the

The statement by defense counsel was

in keeping with that ruling and the further statement in that
case:
We do state a caveat: that if a trial court
unreasonably prevents counsel from reading
and commenting on instructions, it would be
prejudicial error.
Id. at 363.
Appellant's
55

citation

to Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d

(1962), is inapplicable, since the issue in that case was

directed

toward whether

insurance

existed.

an inadvertent mention of the word

It was held

that

"insurance" by both sides

was not prejudicial.
In
interrogated

fact,

earlier

Wheeler

and

in

this

elicited

case
an

plaintiff's

answer

counsel

concerning

an

insurance investigator:
Q:
What
read?

is that yellow piece

of paper you

A:
I believe that was the statement that I
gave to the insurance man the day following.
(R.2074:3-5)
Thus,

the

potential

prejudicial

injection

of

insur-

ance into the matter was brought out by plaintiff's counsel.
The

Court's

attention

is also drawn to the case of

Robinson v. Hreinson. 409 P.2d

121, 17 Utah 2d 261 (1965), at
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264, wherein the court admonished courts and counsel to prevent the introduction of the subject of insurance into a trial.
The citation to Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65
(N.D. 1986) is distinguisable because defense counsel said in
closing argument, "We are talking about money that my client
will have to pay out of his own pocket".
statement

(emphasis added) The

M

pay out of his own pocket" was the objectionable

portion of that argument and was not present in the instant
case.
The citation to Tomeo v. Northern Valley Swim Club,
493

A.2d

544

(N.J.Super.A.D.

1985)

is

also

inapplicable.

There counsel said
[W]hen someone comes up to anyone and says,
"I've been insured and I want you [sic]
money. I want your possessions. I want to
take your house," they must back up the allegations to establish that.
id- at 545.
The statement

falsely

implied

that defendant would

face financial ruin in the event of an adverse verdict.

That

is not the circumstance now before the Court.
For plaintiff to suggest that defense counsel implied
that

there was no

insurance

is

just not borne out by the

record, nor is it possible that the jury was misled into believing that two trucking firms, also defendants, were uninsured.
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The Court's attention is called to Jones v. Carvell,
641 P.2d 105 (Utah, 1982).

The Supreme Court said:

In this case, defendant did not take the
stand, and references to the sorrow of the
defendant and the distress he himself suffered in causing the death of a child violated the bounds of proper argument, and that
impropriety was compounded by defendant's
having admitted the plaintiff's allegations
of willful intoxication or willfulness so as
to prevent such evidence from reaching the
jury. Had the jury been permitted to hear
the evidence of liability, it may have totally
discounted
defendant's
self-inflicted
sorrow. Although the argument was improper,
we do not think that it affected the fundamental fairness of the trial, and reversal is
not, therefore, called for because we do not
believe a different result would have occurred, (emphasis added)
The

statements

of

counsel

in

this

case were

fair

comment on the case and were not prejudicial.
POINT VI
There Is No Basis for a Claim to Allow Plaintiff to Amend to Claim Punitive Damages.
Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to amend his complaint to add a claim for punitive damages.

(R.1325-1339)

Plaintiff's claim was that Wheeler had falsified driver's logs
in reckless disregard for public safety.
which

the plaintiff

disregard

for

relied

public

to produce

safety was

that

The testimony upon
a claim

of

reckless

of Mr. Hewitt, whose

affidavit was attached to the motion to amend.
After

hearing

full

testimony

from Mr. Hewitt, the

court concluded that his testimony was without adeguate foun-
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dation and was irrelevant, and granted defendants1 motion in
limine.

Thus, even if amendment had been allowed, the evi-

dence would not have gone to the jury.
The matter of amendments to pleadings is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.

In Girard v. Appleby.

660 P.2d 245 (1983). the court said:
In any event, the granting of leave to amend
is a matter which lies within the broad discretion of the court, and its rulings are not
to be disturbed in the absence of showing of
an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice
to the complaining party.
Id., at 248
See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455
(1983) at page 464. and Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. 746 P.2d
1189 (1987) at page 90, and Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P. 794 at
page 797 (1987).
In any event, amendment to the pleadings to include a
claim for punitive damages is unnecessary, as pointed out in
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., fe75 P.2d 1179 (1983).
where at page 1182 the court said:
Thus, if the plaintiff were able to adduce
the necessary foundational evidence at trial,
she could claim punitive damages under Rule
54(c) without a formal amendment to the
pleadings.
[citing authority ijm support of
that determination.]
Thus, if plaintiff had been able to lay the foundation for the issue of punitive damages, it would have been
unnecessary

to plead

punitive damages
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ih order to have the

matter

submitted

to the

jury.

In this case, the plaintiff

could not establish a foundation to admit the evidence at all.
POINT VII
The Trial Court Did Not Err in its Instruction on Wheeler's Duty to Set Out Flares or
V Triangles.
Instruction No. 24 is almost verbatim the instruction
requested by plaintiff, and it correctly stated Wheeler's duty
under federal regulations to place emergency devices "as soon
as

possible"

after

stopping

on

the

shoulder,

"but

in any

event, within ten minutes."
Appellant would have this Court believe that 49 CFR
322.22(b) leaves nothing to the jury to determine.

Of neces-

sity the phrase "as soon as possible" requires the jury to
determine whether it was possible or not in this case.
At plaintiff's request, and despite the fact that the
court had already directed a verdict of negligence for parking
beside the highway, the court gave the jury an instruction
regarding

the placement

of

flares and

triangles.

The jury

could not have determined whether Wheeler was further negligent for failure to put out the warning devices without an
evaluation of whether or not he should have put them out.
The regulation that flares should be placed "as soon
as possible, but in any event within ten minutes" inherently
implies that it may not be possible to place flares if to do
so would

take longer

than the time a vehicle
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is stopped.

Wheeler's

testimony was that he was stuped

three minutes.

no longer than

Under questioning by plajintiff's counsel, he

also stated that he did not place warning devices, because to
do so would take longer than the period he would be stopped.
(R.2158:7-9)

The regulation does not contemplate that warning

devices must be placed on all short stops, or it would not put
an outside limit of ten minutes for placing them.

Under the

circumstances of this case, the jury could well conclude that
it was not possible to place flares.
Testimony showed that Wheeler h£d complied with the
regulation on placement of warning devides.
was

not

inconsistent

with

or

The instruction

contradictory

duty, but did express that duty.

to

defendant's

The instruction on flares

and triangles was a proper one.
POINT VIII
The Trial Court Conducted a Sufficient and
Thorough Voir Dire Examination o^ Prospective
Jurors.
Plaintiff

asserts

that

his

cas|e was

prejudiced

by

voir dire examination of the jurors insluf f icient to uncover
bias pertaining to tort reform publicity

As stated in State

v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439:
It follows that whether the trial court
abused its discretion in conducting voir dire
turns on whether, considering th^ totality of
the questioning. counsel was j afforded an
adequate opportunity to gain th£ information
necessary to valuate jurors.
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On appeal, an appellant has the burden of
establishing that reversible error resulted
from an abuse of discretion. (emphasis added)
Id. at 448.
An examination of the conference held in chambers on
the voir dire requested by plaintiff (R. 1987-1995) and of the
voir

dire

examination

itself

(R.

)

shows that the court conducted an in-depth, careful, and thorough examination to allow all relevant issues to be examined.
Plaintiff

claims

he

submitted

a

letter

sent

by

Wheeler's insurer. Farmers Insurance, to all its Utah insureds
several days before trial

(R.1271).

In fact, an examination

of that document shows that it was not a letter at all. but a
page from the magazine Friendly Exchange published by Farmers
Insurance Group.
The jurors were all questioned
that they had in their homes.

as to the magazines

The court's discussion in the

voir dire conference indicated that if jurors were subscribers
to an insurance journal, or some such magazine, that it could
be pursued further (R.1987:7-17).

In this case, by the use of

that question on magazines, counsel secured additional information which otherwise would have been improper.
In Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d
929 (Utah App. 1988). the Court said that
Whenever a religious organization is a party
to the litigation, voir dire regarding the
jury panel's religious affiliations is proper.
933.
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It
asked

the

church

would

have

religious

was

been

improper

affiliations

a party.

However,

in

of

when

this

the
asked

case

to

jurors,
about

have

since

their

no

maga-

zines, the most common responses were Reader's Digest. National Geographic,

and

the LDS magazines.

plaintiff was able to determine which

[Thus, by this device
jurors were members of

the LDS Church.
In his opening statement
mony
the

by the plaintiff
plaintiff

had

(R.2054:17-23) and in testi-

(R.2718:10-20),

received

a

call

counsel

to

serve

indicated
an

LDS

prior to the accident, and was then waiting to go.

that

mission

The maga-

zine question thus served to enable plaintiff to select a jury
sympathetic

to plaintiff's

frustration

in not

being

able

to

fulfill that mission.
In plaintiff's memorandum

in support of his proposed

voir dire questions regarding the insurance crisis, the articles

attached

counsel
were

to

described

articles

that
as

indicative

published

Tribune and Newsweek.
and

half

entitled

prior

memorandum

to

"Craziness

in

the

(R.1249) which

of

an alleged

Deseret

News

plaintiff's

"media
and

blitz"

Salt

Lake

All had been published more than a year

trial.

He

further

alludes

to an

article

in the Courtrooms" from the Reader's Di-

gest, but does not designate when that article was published.
He further refers to an article (R.1271) and acknowledges that
that article came from Friendly Exchange, a magazine
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sent by

Farmers Insurance to its insureds.
question

on

jurors, none

magazines
of whom

and

the

Thus, the relevance of the

answers

indicated

that

of

the

prospective

they received

Friendly

Exchange.
As indicated in Maltby v. Cox Const. Co.. Inc.. 598
P.2d
court

336 at page 341. without
could

not

determine

necessitate further inquiry.

the date of publication, the

whether

proximity

in

time might

At voir dire in this case, after

each juror had answered as to his magazines, plaintiff did not
request further examination of those who answered
subscribed

to Reader's Digest

to find

that they

out if their reading

might bias them or if they had read the "Craziness" article.
Plaintiff's requested voir dire questions No. 9. 10.
22. 23. 32(e). 34. 35. 36 and 37 were all objected to by defendants and not given by the court because of their injection
into the lawsuit of the issue of insurance.

As pointed out in

Tias. supra.
These questions particularly as they raise
the issue of insurance are and were properly
refused as this Court has previously indicated:
The question of insurance is immaterial and
should not be injected into the trial; and
it is the duty of both counsel and the court
to guard against it.
id., at 440.
The problem with plaintiff's questions on tort reform
publicity and the articles presented to the court is that in
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order

to

ask

jurors

questions

about

tt^eir

reading

of

such

articles, the questions will necessarily jtaint the jurors.

In

a procedure intended to find fair and impartial jurors, plaintiff

would

ask

questions

pertaining

to) publicity

allegedly

creating bias, bringing awareness of the crisis to the attention of

jurors not previously

aware of

it.

By such disclo-

sure, the questions make the jurors "tainted" and unavailable
for service.
The problem with asking question^ about the insurance
crisis and tort reform is that the issuG of insurance is injected

into

jurors

would

Also,

the

case.

also

be

in cases where

If

such

informed
there

questioning
when

is no

thdre

were
is

no

permitted,
insurance.

insurance, could you bring

out knowledge of assets, or lack thereof, for satisfying
judgment.
would

Once the issue has gone that ftar. then certainly it

be urged

insurance

is

case at bar.

to

disclose

inadequate

opens

a

numerous

to

for

the

jury when

the claimed

the

recovery,

amount
as

of

in the

i
Inadequate assets would be cj further issue.

The propriety
injecting

the

of

the

prohibition

into the case any mention
Pandora's
other

box

rules

to
on

a

under

Rule

of jinsurance

never-ending

admissibility I of

pursuit

411 of

is that it
violating

evidence

as

to

assets, how a judgment might be paid, and whether or not the
defendants themselves are without assets.
The thrust of the questions urged by appellant, ques-
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tions 24-31, 33, 36, 32(e) 34, 35, and 37, could hardly be
expected to do other than alert the jury to a prohibited area
of the existence of insurance.
The argument that if insurance, under Rule 411, may
be mentioned in order to show bias and prejudice of a witness,
then it certainly should be allowed in the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, ignores the fact that in each case
as pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court, the discretion of the
judge is not to be lightly interfered with.

The judge who is

at hand and viewing the context and the flavor of the case is
better able to determine whether the questions requested are
going to be prejudicial or helpful in seating a fair and impartial jury.
One of the cases relied upon by appellant is a Montana case, Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (1979).

But even in

that case, the court said:
[A]s a prelude to any questions concerning
whether a potential juror has read or heard
anything to indicate that jury verdicts for
plaintiffs in personal injury cases result in
higher insurance premiums for everyone, an
attorney must ask certain general introductory questions.
The court

pointed

out what

those preliminary ques-

tions were, and went on:
If, however, no positive responses are received to these introductory inquiries, there
is no reason to pursue further the line of
inquiry we have approved above.
Id. at 695.
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In this case, the court asked those preliminary questions and indicated in the voir dire conference (R.1988:14-16.
1993:14-18) and the interrogation (R.
would

pursue

the

matter

or would

). that he
not.

depending

upon the

jurors' response.
Plaintiff's proposed

voir dire question No. 13 was

not couched in terms that would determine if the jury was fair
and impartial.

It was intended to fix the idea in the minds

of the jury that it was a $3,000,000 casej.
objectionable question.

As such, it was an

The court asked whether jurors would

be willing to award, if the evidence scj proved, a "substantial" verdict.
the

correct

Certainly that question was in keeping with

discretion

the

court

shouljd

exercise

in these

matters.
With the exception of the insurance questions, counsel was invited to submit any additional (questions of a probative nature to the inquiries counsel needed in order to exercise preemptory challenges at the conclusion of the court's
examination.

Counsel did offer additional questions, and the

record shows that, with the exception of the specific insurance

questions

allowed

all

and

improper

questions

publicity

counsel

were

Questions, the court

desjirous

of

asking,

in

keeping with State v. Worthen. 89 Utah Adv. Rep. 21.
P.2d

(1988).

It is the respondents1 position that the

trial court exactly followed the parameters described in the
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supplemented

case

of

Hornsby.

supra.

See

also

Jenkins

v.

Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (1981). and Saltas v. Afflect. et al. 99
Utah 381. 105 P.2d 176. wherein the Court said:
Due consideration should be given to the
trial judge's somewhat advantaged position in
determining which persons would be fair and
impartial [citations omitted], and his determination should not be disturbed unless he
abuses his discretion.
Jenkins, at 53 6.
POINT IX
The Trial Court Correctly Excluded
Videotape Demonstration.
Plaintiff
showing

of

filed

a

the videotape

dants filed a memorandum

motion

in

demonstration

Ostler's

limine

to

allow

(R.908-915).

the

Defen-

in opposition to plaintiff's motion

(R.968-983).
Hearing on that motion was held by the court, and the
argument is set forth in the abstract of the transcript of the
hearing of October 23. 1987

(R.

).

Counsel indi-

cated that they attempted to recreate the accident as if the
truck had not been there.

The court questioned what might

have been had the facts not been as they were and the truck
not there.

Nevertheless the court viewed the videotape demon-

stration (R.
dum with

).

the affidavit

Plaintiff supplemented his memoran-

of Val Shupe. who had already

been

deposed, and counsel pointed out to the court that Mr. Shupe
indicated that one of three or four different scenarios might

have happened in the absence of the truc)^. and that there was
no way

he

could

transpired.

tell which

of

those

Scenarios might

(R.7:13-25. 8:1-25. 9:1-25. 10:1-9).

have

The court

in its ruling indicated the reason why ttie evidence was inadmissible when he said
It appears to me. Mr. DeBry. y<}u are trying
to get something into this case that is so
speculative that has nothing to! do. really,
with what has happened in thi]s case.
It
isn't reconstruction, this is t jcying to determine in some way what might possibly have
happened.
I can see no valid reason for
permitting you to do it. I'm going to deny
your motion to view the video a^nd grant the
motion in limine to eliminate it.
(R.ll:6-

)
In the presentation and argument\ and in the memoranda

filed,

the

defense

showed

that

the

difference

between

the

so-called recreation and the facts of th4 case were multiple,
including the age and skill of the demonstrator

(the demon-

strator being a stunt driver), the vehicle involved, the stunt
driver's knowledge

of the impending

occurrence, whereas the

decedent driver obviously did not see what was ahead of him or
he would not have run into the truck, the fatigue was not the
same, the steering was speculative because the demonstration
showed that the stunt driver had both hajnds on the wheel and
steered after he went into the barrow pit. the demonstration
having been taped

in daylight

instead

o^ the middle of the

night, the braking that was carried out by the demonstration
driver was conjectural, the other vehicl)es in the area were
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not as had been the case at the time of the accident, the
angle of leaving the road, the speed which was assumed but not
demonstrated, and the erratic driving of the driver just prior
to

impact.

There

were

so

many

discrepancies

that

the

so-called demonstration was not applicable, as is borne out by
the affidavit of Newell Knight (R.977-979).
As stated in Fisher v. Trapp, supra.
The trial court's determination of the
adequate foundation is solely within the
discretion of the trial court. Tias v.
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 490 (1979)
wherein the court also quoted from Edwards, supra:

[T]he admissibility of accident reconstruction evidence depends in large measure upon
the foundation laid.
The expertise of the
witness, his degree of familiarity with the
necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion and the facts adduced must
be established.
In this case, the court denied the admission of the
videotape because the foundation attempted to be laid did not
show

that

the

demonstration

video

had

adequate

comparable

factors to make it a recreation but only a demonstration of a
possible circumstance

that could have happened

if the truck

was not there, and not a recreation of what did happen.
It was properly excluded by the court.
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POINT X
The Courts Instruction on Independent Intervening Cause Was Correct.
Appellant takes issue with Instructions No. 25 and 27
given by the court and cites to the Restatement

(Second) of

Torts and his characterization that the instructions did not
correctly reflect the state of the law in regard to superseding

or

intervening

proximate

cause.

In Watters

v. Querry

(Watters II), 626 P.2d 455 (1981). a re^rend collision case,
the court held that foreseeability of the second actor's act
is an issue that must be resolved by the finder of the fact
and held that
In finding that defendant's negligence was
not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, the jury necessarily concluded that the
degree of Querry's inattentiveness in this
case was not foreseeable.
Id. at 458.
Therefore, the later negligent
proximate cause of the collision.

act became the sole

That is a close parallel to

the determination made by the jury in this case.
The court in Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra.
a 1983 case, stated:
The law of superseding causation is. as a
general proposition, more easily stated than
applied. A person's negligence is not superseded by the negligence of another if the
subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable.
Id. at 219.
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The Court

then cited

its earlier

decision adopting

Restatement (Second) of Torts 447# pertaining to the issue of
superseding or intervening cause.

The Court held in that case

that the instructions given by the court were erroneous because they did not submit the proximate cause issue to the
jury for determination.

In the case of Godesky, supra, the

Court referred back to its decision in Watters II, supra, and
reiterated that it is correct that a more recent negligent act
may break the chain of causation and relieve the liability of
the prior negligent actor under the proper circumstances, and
that proximate causation is a matter of fact to be determined
by the jury.
The Court went on to discuss that the instructions
given

in the Godesky

concepts

on proximate

case encompassed
cause

and

the Court's previous

intervening

or

superseding

proximate cause.
In 1985, in Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d
240 (Utah), the

Supreme Court reiterated as follows:

The standard definition of proximate cause is
"that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. It
is the efficient cause -- the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury."
It was plaintiffs1 burden to show that defendants1 conduct was a substantial causative
factor that led to Mitchell's death.
Id. at 245. 246.
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Again

in

1985.

v. \ Melby.

in Williams

699 P.2d

723

(Utah 1985), the Court laid out the elements for a negligent
action in headnote

3 at page 726.

At tjeadnote 9, page 728,

the Court said:
The issue of what constitutes h superseding
cause can not be determined by tjhe simplistic
formula that the cause which occurs last in
time is, as a matter of law, a superseding
cause.
Indeed, conduct may be negligent
simply because subsequent negligent conduct
by another is foreseeable.
The Court in that case said further:
The law of superseding causation is, as a
general proposition, more easilt stated than
applied. A person's negligence lis not superseded by the negligence of another if the
subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable.
Id., at 729.
See also Bennion v. LeGrand Jotjnson Const. Co., 701
P.2d

1078 (Utah 1985). Massey v. Utah Po^er & Light, 609 P.2d

937

(1980),

Reese

v.

Alberbertsens,

Pauley v. Zarbock, 504 P.2d

5^7

P.2d

(1978).

999, 29 Utah 2d 30 (1972), Skol-

lingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, ^84 P.2d
Larsen v. Johnson. 440 P.2d

130

886. 21 Utah 2d

1180 (1971),

(1968). Hall v.

Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 161. 417 P.2d 664 (1966).
Thus,

the

instruction

to be giyen by a trial

court

has to be designed to explain to the jury these elements
In Instruction No. 25

(R.1671-1672) and

Instruction

No. 27 (R.1675-1676) . the trial court inc|orporated the princi-
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pies
quoted

and

decisions

set

forth

in the

five

decisions

above

in a manner to explain both the interrelationship of

foreseeability, proximate cause, and superseding cause.
In Instruction No. 25, Addendum, the court correctly
defined proximate cause and that the law does not necessarily
recognize only one proximate cause, that the acts and omissions of two can combine to concurrently cause an injury, and
that negligence must be of substantial material fact to bring
about the harm in order to constitute proximate cause.
In Instruction No. 27, Addendum, the court also defined

that

if the second

cause was reasonably foreseeable,

then the first person's conduct would still constitute proximate cause, or if the likelihood of the occurrence of the same
general nature, was foreseeable, then it would not exonerate
the initial negligent acts of Stanley Wheeler in parking the
vehicle on the shoulder of the highway.
The combined analysis of Watters II, Harris v. Utah
Transit Authority, Godesky v. Provo City Corp., Mitchell v.
Pearson Enterprises, and Williams v. Melby, supra, all demonstrate that the trial judge in this matter made a careful and
insightful submission of the instructions on foreseeability,
proximate

cause,

and

superseding

or

intervening

cause, in

compliance with the mandates of the Utah Supreme Court.
instructions were not in error.

As stated in Watters II,

Once the jury has looked at the facts,
weighed them, made its decision based upon
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The

substantial, competent evidence, we are precluded from disturbing its findings.
Id- at 458.
This

Court

should

rule

that

t^ie instructions were

properly given on the issue.
POINT XI
The Court Correctly Denied Plaintiff's Motion
for a Directed Verdict Against Wheeler on
Causation.
Both prior to and during the course of the trial of
this matter, plaintiff moved the court for a directed verdict
on the issue of causation against the defendant Wheeler.

In

the second day of trial, the court granted the motion for a
directed verdict on the issue of the negligence of Wheeler,
but reserved for trial the issue of proximate cause (R.21042106) and instructed the jury during the course of the trial
that he had ruled that the parking of ttie vehicle was negligence as a matter of law.

He reserved fpr trial the issue of

proximate cause.
The court gave Instruction No. 23 (R.1669) in which
he directed negligence as a matter of law against Wheeler.
In urging this Court that the trial court committed
error in not ruling on causation as a matter of law. plaintiff
ignores the cases cited under Point
other

cases handed

Court

of Appeals

IX above, and numerous

down by the Utah Supreme Court

holding

and the

that the matters of causation are

almost universally issues of fact to be decided by the jury.
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Only in the most extreme circumstances, where reasonable minds
could not differ, would the issue of causation be taken from
the jury.
Plaintiff cites no Utah cases in support of his position that the court should have ruled on causation as a matter
of law, and ignores the literally dozens of cases holding that
causation is almost always an issue of fact for the jury.
On the

issue of a directed

verdict, the Court is

cited to White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297 (1983), wherein, on the
issue

of

a

directed

verdict, the

Court

said

"Evidence

is

viewed in a light most favorable to the party moved against.11
In this case, the denial of the directed verdict on
causation must

be viewed

in a light most favorable

to the

party moved against, namely defendant Wheeler, and the decision of the trial judge to submit the matter to the jury is in
keeping with the numerous cases cited throughout this brief,
and many others too numerous to itemize.
On the issue of the denial of the motion for directed
verdict on causation, the Courtfs attention is also drawn to
Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (1987), wherein the Court said:
A motion for a directed verdict requires the
trial court to consider evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom it
is directed.
The case should not be taken
from the jury where there is substantial
dispute in the evidence.
In this case

there was substantial

dispute

in the

evidence, for under the instruction given, all the driver of
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the plaintiff's vehicle had to do was coknply with Instruction
No. 22 (R.1668);

that is, not remove his car from the lane of

traffic until it was safe to do so, and there would have been
That is the premise upon which the jury con-

no accident.

eluded that the parking of the truck was not the proximate
cause of the accident, but that the driving from the lane of
traffic by the later actor was the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
If

the

reasoning

of

plaintiff

were

adopted

here,

there would be no justification for the analysis or reasoning
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 447, to which
plaintiff
cause.

has

alluded,

having

a

definition

of

superseding

His analysis would make a determination of negligence

merge with a causation such that negligence would always be
causation.

If the analysis and reasoning of plaintiff in this

regard were adopted, then the Supreme Court, in the five leading cases chronicled in Point IX above. Would be unnecessary.
I
By plaintiff's analysis, in all cases of combined negligence,
there would be concurrent negligence and there would be no
such

thing

as

superseding

negligence.

The

definition

on

superseding or intervening negligence as an intervening sole
proximate cause would be a definition without purpose.
The court submission of the issije of proximate cause
to the jury, and of the issue of intervening or superseding
cause, was in compliance with the mandates of the Utah Supreme

-59-

Court decisions and was a correct submission of the case.
When plaintiff argues that reasonable minds could not
differ on the negligence of Wheeler being the cause of the
plaintiff's injuries, he concludes that none of the jurors,
who entered a unanimous verdict in this case after five days
of trial, whom he had already approved and passed for cause,
were reasonable people, since they found unanimously that the
negligence of Stanley Wheeler was not a proximate cause of the
injuries of the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The pronouncements

of the appellate courts of Utah

have long evidenced their abiding respect for the jury system.
They have pronounced rules in accordance therewith.
in Robinson v. Hreinson, supra, said

The Court

that the jury verdict

should not be overturned unless it clearly appears that there
has been abuse of discretion.
In this case, the trial judge was careful, diligent,
and circumspect in all of his rulings, which is demonstrated
by an examination of the record and a recognition of the patience with which he responded to the various motions made by
both parties in the action.

In Stanqer v. Sentinel Security

Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (1983), in Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d
(1985), and

766

(1985), in Matter of Kessler, 702 P.2d 86

in Peats v. Commercial

Security Bank, 746 P.2d

1191 (1987), the Court has consistently stated that it will
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not substitute its judgment for that of a jury.
As stated in the last cited case
We review the jury's verdict in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, and
accord the evidence presented a^id every reasonable inference fairly drawn £rom the evidence the same degree of deference.
Id. at 1192.
In this case, plaintiff had a full five-day trial on
the

issues

trial court.
plaintiff's

presented,

which

were

fairl^

ruled

upon

by

After its deliberation, th^ jury concluded
injuries were

of the accident,

caused

determined

by the sole proximate

by the

the
that

cause

jury to be the driver of

the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding.|
This Court should affirm that jury verdict.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of October. 1988

M. Day lei
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ADDENDUM NO.

1

my analysis is, if you wish to hear it, is that we have cles
vision in about a five degree cone of vision with each eye,
although a field of vision is approximately 180 degrees,
normal two-eyed, you know, person.11
Q

(By Mr. Jeffs)

Thank ^ou.

That's far enough.

Specifically, what factors differentiate between being
asleep and in this low state of,iwhatever you call it,
arousal or whatever?
A

What factors?

Q

Yes. How do you differentiate between the two?

A

Okay.

Closing of the qyes is a, is a clear-cut

landmark, so to speak.

Once the lids close over the eyes,

then no more visual information i|s coming through.

That's

one landmark.
Other than that, short of brainwaves, brainwave
i

recording, there aren't, aren't many criteria to go on.
Q

And in this case you have no way of determining it

because the man died, the driver died; you have no way to
determine brainwaves or asleep or either?
i

A

Oh.

I wouldn't even, evjen if he had survived.
MR. JEFFS:

I think that's all the cross
l

examination at this time, your Honpr.
MR. DEBRY:

WeJLl, your Honor, I'm ready

to argue that, if I could, as to the witness, unless you
have other questions. May the witiess step down?
2402,

1I

Q

Let me ask it this way:

2

whether it's, you've trained drivers, you teach drivers, you

3

teach companies about these things; do you have an opinion

4

whether it's foreseeable, to a reasonable truck driver,

5

parked on the paved shoulder, that other errant vehicles will

6

wander off into that shoulder and perhaps hit him?

7

A

8

Federal Regulations that, which he is required to know

9

before operating, he is required to be aware of it, particu-

It should be, sir.

Do you have an opinion

It ip a requirement of the

10

larly, the Part 392 which is his part of the Regulations,

11

that he must not stop in these areas; and that if he does, he

12

must immediately or as soon as possible place his triangles

13

out.

14

Q

15

attend seminars and conventions and you teach truckers,

16

do you hear common talk about when!truckers talk about

17

people running into the back of them?

18

among truckers?

19

I A

Does that, I'm sorry, I'm trying to answer.
I think it's okay.

As you attend meetings and you

Is that common talk

That is a common subject that comes up at almost

20

every seminar, even with bus seminars, for at least since

21

1982, and quite occasionally before then.

22

it's been a frequent subject.

23

I Q

But since 1982

Do you htink there is an^ trucker in The United

24

States that doesn't know when he parks at the side of the

25

road in a paved shoulder that somebody might run into the
;

1
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ADDENDUM NO.

2

INSTRUCTION NO.

£

f

You will note in a negligence case that in order
for a party to be entitled to recoverf for injuries caused
by another's negligence, the party alleging negligence must
prove not only negligence on the part of the other party,
but also that such negligence was a proximate cause of such
injuries.
enough.

In other words, mere proof of negligence is not
It must be' shown by a preponderance of the evidence

that the negligent act, or acts, complained of was, or
were, a proximate cause of the accident and injuries in
question in order to establish a right to recover.
I
In a negligence case the term "proximate cause11
relates to the cause of the u«• i i %li• n f i n quufi I ijji Mini 1 h"
injury or damages resulting therefrorii.

The proximate cause

is that act or failure to act which rjecessarily sets into
operation factors which, in natural and continuous sequence
result in the accident and without which the accident would
not have occurred.

Such a cause may be an act of either

commission or omission, or both.
The law does not necessarily recognize only one
proximate cause of an a<^^tei*&4 consisting of only one factor,
one act, or the conduct or only one person.

To the contrary,

the separate acts or omissions of two or more persons may

work concurrently as a proximate cause of an injury, and if
such be the case, the acts or omissions of each such person
are regarded in law as a proximate cause.

However, while

in an accident case both parties may have been negligent,
it does not necessarily follow that the negligence of each
is, in fact, a proximate cause of the accident or injuries
in question.

Whether or not such negligence is such a

proximate cause is a question of fact for you as a jury to
determine from all ,of the evidence in the case and the facts
and circumstances disclosed thereby, guided by the applicable
principles of law as set forth in these instructions.
The negligence that is conftnitted must be a substantial or material factor in bringing about the harm in
order to constitute a proximate cauqe.

INSTRUCTION NO. 27

If an injury arises from tiwo distinct causes,
consideration then must be given to jthe question whether the
causal connection between the conduct of the party responsible
for the first cause and the injury was broken by the intervention of a new, independent cause.
If so, the person responsible for the first cause
would not be liable for the injury.

If, however, the inter-

vening cause or the likelihood of anj occurrence of the same
general nature was foreseen or shouljd reasonably have been
foreseen by the person responsible for the first cause, then
such personfs conduct would be the ptroximate cause of the
injury, notwithstanding the intervening cause, and he would
be liable therefor.
Thus, if you find the collision of the vehicle
driven by Stephen Ostler with the trkctor-trailer of Albina
Transfer Company, Inc., parked on thfe shoulder of the highway,
or the likelihood of an occurrence op the same general nature,
was within the natural and continuou^ sequence of events
which might reasonably be foreseen t\) follow the actions of
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that the actions of
Stanley Wheeler were a concurring proximate cause of the
collision, even though the later negligent act of Stephen
Ostler cooperated to cause the •accident.
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler in causing
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the collision were of such character as not reasonably to
be foreseen in the natural and contiguous sequence of
events started by Stanley Wheeler, then the acts of Steven
Ostler are the independent intervening cause and, therefore,
the sole proximate cause of the injury.

